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In this short response, I address some of the general themes that have been raised by the 
commentators. I discuss these under three main heads. These are, first, the relationship 
between descriptive and normative accounts of the criminal law; second, the meaning of 
civil order and its place in my argument, and; third, an explanation for my focus on cer-
tain types of offenses in the analysis of the special part of the criminal law. 
* * * 
I am very grateful to the five discussants for the time and the thought they have given to 
read and reflect on the arguments in my book. In their generous comments, they have 
given me a great deal to think about and opportunities to explore new ideas. In this short 
response, rather than engage with each of them point by point, I shall address some of the 
more general themes that they raise in common. These are themselves, to a great extent, 
interrelated but I shall discuss them under three main heads: (i) the relationship between 
descriptive and normative accounts of the criminal law; (ii) the meaning of civil order; and 
(iii) my focus on certain types of offenses in the special part of the criminal law. 
I. Normative and/or Descriptive? 
One of the distinctions used by some of the commentators—and indeed one which is 
found throughout discussions of criminal law—is that between descriptive and normative 
accounts of the criminal law. Descriptive accounts are statements of what the law is, or of 
its history, while normative accounts are discussions of what the law ought to be. Descrip-
tive accounts of any particular system might be measured against normative ideals or 
might provide data for normative theorizing, but are not considered to have any direct 
normative implications. Conversely, normative theory might draw on accounts of the par-
ticular laws and their enforcement, or might be more or less based around the law of any 
particular jurisdiction, but the tasks of description and normative theorizing are under-
stood as different kinds of exercise.1 The question that is thus posed, for example by 
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Vincent Chiao (see Chiao at 5-7; see also Schneebaum at 51-52), is what normative theory 
of the criminal law has to learn from history: that is to say whether the descriptively rich 
account of the development of the criminal law set out in the book has implications for 
normative theory and, if so, what these might be.  
However, I think that the use of this distinction misrepresents what I am trying to 
do in the book, which is not only an argument that actual systems of law act as a con-
straint on normative justifications, or even a plea for normative theorizing to be more 
aware of the contingency of particular values or understandings of the nature of wrong—
important though both of these points are.2 More radically I would claim that the book is 
making a normative argument, and that the historical account of the development of the 
law should not only be seen as, in some sense, a precursor to normative argument (some-
thing recognized by Kerr, e.g., Kerr at 12). Of course, as a normative argument the book 
does not take the form which is easily recognizable to criminal law theory—that is to say 
that it does not engage directly with the arguments of leading normative theorists, and 
there is little or no explicit discussion of what the law ought to be—a so-called prescrip-
tive account of criminalization. So in what sense is it normative? This is in part an 
argument that starting points for normative theorizing import certain unexamined as-
sumptions. This is less the claim that the values might be contingent, about which I think 
that Chiao is rightly skeptical, and rather that it is important to understand the kind of 
social relations or institutions to which the theorist is seeking to apply the values. There is 
an example of this in the chapter on property offenses where I argue that the standard 
categorization of property offenses in terms of theft, breach of trust and fraud is less a 
“universal” way of categorizing the law than a reification of a set of distinctions that were 
developed to explain the law, and distinguish it from civil law, at the end of the eighteenth 
century.3 We should thus not attempt to shoehorn contemporary law, where it relates to 
the protection of systems of credit, into these categories without first reflecting on wheth-
er they are appropriate to modern social relations and what it is that the law is seeking to 
achieve. These are rarely only abstract questions about values, but also engage with the 
purposes or aims of certain sets of rules. This point is then connected to the broader ar-
gument which is that law should be understood as a form of governmental project which 
I shall set out in the next section.  
II. Civil Order 
One of the questions raised by several of the commentators concerns my argument that 
the modern criminal law aims in a broad sense at the securing of civil order: Is the con-
ception too general and open-ended? Is civil order only about the civilizing of individuals 
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and do we need to know more about the motivations of the civilizers? Or how does the 
broad aim of securing civil order relate to the development of particular offenses or cate-
gories of offense (see, e.g., Chiao at 3-4; Kerr at 16; Lernestedt at 24; Schneebaum at 43-
44)? This argument about securing civil order has various different dimensions, and given 
that this is perhaps the most theoretically complex (and contested) part of the argument, I 
welcome the opportunity to try and restate briefly, and to clarify, the nature of the claim 
that I am making here. 
The starting point for my thinking about securing civil order is the suggestion of 
MacCormick—and it is really no more than a suggestion, as he does not develop this 
claim—that criminal law only becomes “fully intelligible” from the perspective of under-
standing the “civility of civil society.”4 This is significant, in my view, because it is distinct 
from the claim which is the starting point for much contemporary theorizing about crimi-
nal law, that criminal law is primarily intelligible from the perspective of the justification 
of individual punishment. MacCormick thus invites us to look at the criminal law from 
the perspective of the role(s) that criminal laws play in shaping the civility of civil society. 
(This, of course, does not mean that the justification of punishment is not significant; but 
it should not be our starting point.) Criminal law is to be seen from the perspective of the 
roles and responsibilities that it defines and how, alongside other bodies of law (such as 
tort, contract or welfare laws) it distributes certain social risks. It follows, of course, from 
this point, as Chiao also argues, that criminal law should be seen as a form of public law, 
subject to legitimization through the political process.5 
In attempting to develop this insight I distinguish between three different dimen-
sions of the idea, each of which play a slightly different role in the overall argument. 
These are the meaning of civil order itself; civilization and the “civilizing process”; and 
civility as a form of sociality.6 These are analytically distinct, though they may overlap in 
practice. Just as importantly these are not “things” in the sense that civil order or civility 
may be a matter of degree; hence the argument is not that these can be defined in advance 
as elements of criminal law, but that these are vectors in terms of which we can “make 
sense” of the criminal law and its role in society. And in addition these features can pro-
vide a critical perspective. The claim is not, for example, that the criminal law, or society, 
is necessarily becoming more civilized, but that historically criminal law was conceived of 
as a “civilizing” instrument and that how it was (and is) used for particular purposes or 
against particular social groups sheds critical light on the broader liberal project. 
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The idea of civil order is linked specifically to the development of the state, and 
certain features of a legal order (the monopoly of violence; the regulation of jurisdiction; 
the codification or institutionalization of rules of law as norms of conduct; and the com-
mitment to individual liberty and the rule of law as limits on the power of the state).7 
These, it should be clear, are not advanced as a stipulative definition of criminal law in 
general, but as features of modern criminal law that may be present to a greater or lesser 
degree in any particular system of modern criminal law at any particular time. Modern 
criminal law is thus, as stated earlier, a system of public law. This last point is important 
because it links the idea of modern criminal law to the idea of governance by rules, in the 
sense of being a governmental project. Thus, although as Chiao points out there may be 
societies with similar rules which do not have states, this is in practice highly unlikely since 
it is precisely these institutional features which make the modern criminal law distinctive. 
It is the development of this modern state project of government through criminal law 
which I analyze in the book. Thus civil order is conceived not in terms of a “moral com-
munity,” but as concerned with the “co-ordination of complex modern societies 
composed of a range of entities or legal persons that are responsible, in a range of differ-
ent ways, for their own conduct, for the wellbeing of others, and for the maintenance of 
social institutions.”8 Within this broad framework, co-ordination through law is subject to 
specific requirements and constraints, because modern law addresses citizens as responsi-
ble, autonomous, self-governing subjects. 
This has meant that specification of responsibility, in the sense both of identifying 
conditions for the attribution of liability (retrospective liability) and in the prospective 
sense of imposing obligations and duties on a person who can adapt their conduct to 
norms and plan over time. Of course, while I am primarily concerned in the book with 
analyzing the role which concepts of responsibility play in criminalizing conduct (respon-
sibility as a legal artifact), through the shaping of norms or rules, and in the co-ordination 
of the internal structure of the criminal law, as Arlie Loughnan shows, what she calls the 
“meta-significance” of responsibility (Loughnan at 34) extends well beyond the criminal 
law to responsibility practices more generally. This is in part because it is a means of artic-
ulating moral, social and political values, but also because these responsibility practices 
draw associations with practices outside the criminal law.9 This reach contributes greatly 
to the symbolic power if ideas about criminal responsibility to the wider social order (id. 
at 38-40). A similar point is made by Claes Lernestedt where he points out that while I 
have plenty to say about particular civilizing initiatives, I say little about the larger social 
ideology and political philosophy of the civilizers (Lernestedt at 24). In both cases it is 
clear that I have somewhat neglected the study of this broader political and social picture 
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in the book. In the first case this is, at least in part, because of a (possibly misplaced) de-
sire to play down the centrality of responsibility in order to bring out other, more 
neglected aspects of the modern criminal law. However, Loughnan makes a compelling 
case for engaging with the broader symbolic significance of responsibility, in particular by 
going beyond the now familiar moral and political discussions of responsibility to socio-
logical and social scientific work on responsibility.  
The second case, that of the broad philosophy of the civilizers, is an interesting 
point, for it is certainly true that I have focused on particular initiatives or practices rather 
than tracking shifts in political philosophy more broadly—hiding behind the claim that 
there is a particular kind of modern sensibility or modern social imaginary that has shaped 
and provided the context for the development of the law.10 Indeed, I think that both Lisa 
Kerr and Galia Schneebaum make a similar point in seeking to develop fuller accounts of 
the reasons behind the development of particular areas of law. Kerr explores the decrimi-
nalization and then recriminalization of prostitution in Canada (Kerr at 18-21), while 
Schneebaum argues that in the “making” of abuse offenses, it is necessary to give weight 
to ideas such as human dignity and the way that these have shaped the development of 
the law (e.g., Schneebaum at 50). That said, my argument in the book is not that there is a 
direct connection between ideas of civil order and the development of particular crimes 
such as abuse offenses. It is rather that the development of certain areas of contemporary 
law such as abuse offenses suggest an increasing concern with the protection of the vul-
nerable, a concern that is frequently framed in terms of the need to protect certain rights 
or the autonomy of the victim. The point is that our conception of the civility of civil or-
der is shifting, bringing the demand that criminal law be used in a new way with the 
criminalization of new forms of “uncivil” conduct. This is thus not a retreat from the ar-
guments of the book as Schneebaum suggests (id. at 50), but rather an illustration of the 
ways in which relations between individuals might be conceptualized within the broader 
conception of civil order. 
However, while this might pass muster as an explanation of the development, it is 
clearly inadequate as a full account of the motivations and beliefs of the “civilizers,” to 
use Lernestedt’s term. Perhaps for a model of the kind of detailed work that would need 
to be done to illustrate this it would be appropriate to turn to Peter Ramsay’s The Insecurity 
State.11 This looks at the development of the Anti-Social Behaviour Order in England and 
Wales—a civilizing initiative if ever there was one, in terms of the aims of politicians to 
instill values of respect for others and good citizenship through the use of the (criminal) 
law. However, Ramsay goes beyond the normal condemnations of the ASBO for their 
departure from liberal requirements of fault and their avoidance of procedural protec-
tions. He instead shows how the ASBO can be read as consistent with a different version 
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of liberalism that is concerned to protect the vulnerable and instill a different kind of re-
sponsibility for others. The book thus traces in a very detailed way precisely the kind of 
broader social and political values that legislators and politicians drew on in developing 
this legal instrument. This, or this kind of work, would be one way of meeting the need 
for a more complete account of the ideas or beliefs that motivated the civilizers.  
III. Special Part 
Lernestedt also suggests (Lernestedt at 24-25) that this “space” might have been filled in a 
different way in the special part of the book had I focused on an area of crimes against 
the state, rather than focusing exclusively on crimes between individuals—and I very 
much agree with this point. In my defense here I can only say that the original plan was 
precisely to include a chapter on the crimes of sedition and blasphemy and hate speech 
(or speech crimes) but as the book grew ever longer, and publisher’s deadlines were re-
peatedly missed, I had to abandon that original plan. What the chapter would, I hope, 
have demonstrated was how a more political model of citizenship, based on changing 
standards of conduct in public spaces and changed relationships to political institutions, 
has been fostered through criminal laws which have regulated public and private speech. 
This would both have rounded out the picture in the book focused on interpersonal 
crimes and demonstrated more clearly how the criminal law has shifted from conceiving 
crimes as primarily against the state or sovereign, to conceiving even ostensibly political 
crimes such as hate speech in terms of their impact on individuals. 
That said, the focus on crimes relating to person, property and sex in part III of 
the book was deliberate. While I hesitate to describe what I have done as the “Farmer 
method” (see Kerr at 12)—not because there is no method but because my method fol-
lows in the footsteps of others—the purpose of the focus on these supposedly “core” 
areas of criminal law based on the interests of individuals was precisely to bring a different 
kind of focus to bear on these areas. If my direct inspiration in trying to identify patterns 
in the development of particular crimes was the work of George Fletcher in his seminal 
book, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), my aim was rather different. For all of the vast range 
of erudition displayed in this book, Fletcher’s aim was the rather narrower one of identify-
ing patterns of liability in theft and in homicide, and in the course of doing this he paid 
little attention to either the question of what it was that was being protected by the crimi-
nal law (the content of concepts of property or person) or to the question of whether or 
not there was any kind relation between the object of the law and the forms of liability. 
Thus I quickly found that while Fletcher’s “model” might be a starting point, it could only 
be that and it was necessary to supplement this with the more contextual histories of 
property, personhood or sexuality which have been developed by social historians and 
anthropologists. The aim was then to explore these kinds of links and to show how these 
patterns of criminalization responded to different kinds of social pressures and aims and 
that it was not clear that a single “model” of criminalization theory would fit them all. The 
aim, in short, was to show that there was no core and that there is a need to reflect criti-
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cally on the relationship between general principles and particular areas of the criminal 
law. This does not mean that there is not also a need to reflect critically on other areas or 
categories of law—those which are perhaps rather condescendingly viewed as “peripher-
al” or merely mala prohibita—and, if there is a method, I would hope that others are 
inspired to develop this kind of analysis. 
In the light of this I am delighted that Lisa Kerr has taken up this thought so en-
thusiastically, and her account of recent development in prostitution/sex work laws in 
Canada sheds further light on the risks thrown up by an uncritical application of liberal 
principles such as harm or autonomy. Indeed, she demonstrates clearly how different in-
terests are articulated in the proposed justifications for criminalization, and argues that in 
place of this there is a need for “laws governing prostitution [to] embody a proportionate 
and rational connection between the aims and effects of the law” (Kerr at 21). 
IV. Conclusion 
In concluding I want to make two further comments. The first is to acknowledge that 
there is indeed a tension, as Lernestedt suggests, between legislators and courts or aca-
demics “making” the modern criminal law—and this may be more marked in a common 
law system than in a country like Sweden, as he suggests. While my aspiration was to track 
these equally, and to explore the productive tension between the two, I would concede 
that the book in the end has focused more on the role of academics or theorists in making 
criminal law as an academic discipline. This perhaps comes at the cost of a fuller explora-
tion of the law making process, and also of the analysis of power in the enforcement of 
the criminal law. However, given the starting point of trying to understand how the 
“criminalization question” developed in criminal law theory, it was perhaps inevitable that 
this is where I would end up. Notwithstanding this I hope that there is much to be 
learned from this account of the processes through which theorists have sought to “civi-
lize” the criminal law, through the categorization of offenses and the development of 
general principles which seek to define the discipline—and of the achievements and costs 
of this approach. There is no question that thinking about criminalization should be cen-
tral to criminal law theory but, as Loughnan stresses, there is also a need for greater 
reflexivity about the development of theories of criminalization. 
In closing I want to note one final aspect of the idea of securing civil order which 
I have not yet discussed, which is where I claim that the aim of securing civil order pro-
vides a kind of normative horizon for the criminal law—a claim that provides the overall 
normative framework of the book. As I said earlier, while I consider my book to be ad-
vancing a normative argument, this is not normative theory in the sense in which it is 
conventionally understood. My aim is rather to place discussion of the modern criminal 
law within the broader framework of discussions about the kind of society in which we 
want to live. This, as I argue in chapter 10 of the book, is a matter of discussion of the 
kind of civil order, the distribution of responsibilities, of when it is appropriate to resort 
to criminal law and so on. It is precisely because the concept of civil order (or the role of 
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the criminal law in securing it) is not defined in any prescriptive way that I would argue 
that this is a matter for public debate about the kind of criminal law that we wish to have. 
It is not, in my view, for the theorist to provide a prescriptive account of what the law 
should be on any topic, but rather in a range of different ways to provide critical resources 
that have the potential to enhance or deepen that broader public conversation. And that is 
what I have sought to do in the book. 
 
 
